The effect of foreign competition on product switching activities: A firm level analysis by Nakhoda, Aadil
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effect of foreign competition on
product switching activities: A firm level
analysis
Aadil Nakhoda
University of California, Santa Cruz
31. May 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39167/
MPRA Paper No. 39167, posted 1. June 2012 00:45 UTC
The E¤ect of Foreign Competition on Product Switching
Activities: A Firm Level Analysis
Aadil Nakhoda
First Version: April 2012
This Version: June 2012
Abstract
Pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products or on
production costs may inuence rms to particpate in product switching activities. Firms
switch products if they either add or drop products within their product range. I test
whether pressure from foreign competition is likely to inuence rms that concurrently add
and drop (churn) products rather than rms that i) do not undertake any product switching
activity, ii) add products only, or iii) drop products only. Firms pay substantial xed costs
to switch products and their productivity levels are likely to determine such ability. I
consider whether rms that invest in research and development activities and export their
nal products are likely to churn products as they are able to generate greater productivity
levels than rms that undertake either one of the two activities. As rms constrained by the
lack of adequately educated workers may have workers who cannot adapt to di¤erent set of
skills necessary for product switching activities, I consider whether such rms are likely to
churn products as they are exposed to pressure from foreign competition in comparison to
rms not constrained by the lack of adequately educated workers. In addition, the contract-
intensive nature of an industry can also dictate whether rms exposed to foreign competition
can churn products as they may be constrained due to their contract obligations with their
buyers and suppliers. The results indicate that pressure from foreign competition is likely to
inuence the decision of rms to churn products rather than add products only or undertake
neither product switching activities. There is little evidence that rms facing pressure from
foreign competition will churn products rather than drop products only, except for the most
productive rms that invest in research and development activities and export participation.
Email: anakhoda@ucsc.edu. Address: Economics Department at University of California, Santa Cruz. I
would like to appreciate the invaluable guidance I have received from my PhD committee members, Joshua
Aizenman, Flora Bellone and Justin Marion. I am also grateful to Sean Tanoos for his helpful comments and
suggestions. Any errors and omissions are mine.
Introduction
Firms face an important challenge to allocate their resources so that they can produce a range of
products that provides the greatest value to their customers at the maximum amount of prot.
To achieve this objective, rms may require adding or dropping products as they undertake ac-
tivities related to the switching of their product range1 . Firms can undertake product switching
activities if they either add new products that provide customers with greater value in terms
of quality or produce at a lower marginal cost than other rms. Similarly, rms can undertake
product switching activities if they drop old products that either lack quality, or are produced
ine¢ ciently, or become obsolete. They can also switch products if they add and drop products
concurrently, an activity dened as product churningby Bernard et al (2010) and Iacovone
and Javorcik (2010). Trade liberalization episodes are commonly undertaken by several trading
partners. They not only allow the home country rms to expand their sales in foreign countries
but also increase the presence of foreign goods within the home country. The exposure to foreign
markets and goods can pressure rms to either produce a product range that incurs the lowest
marginal cost or produce at a higher standard of quality. The e¤ect of pressure from foreign
competition can generate incentives for rms to improve their productivity levels through either
investments in research and development (henceforth R & D) activities, or higher quality inputs,
or more educated and skilled workforce. These improvements can consequently allow rms to
switch products.
Dhingra (2010) points out that the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition inuences
the decision of rms to introduce new products and reduce their production costs through
product and process innovations that can promote substantial improvements in the productivity
of rms. For instance, rms exposed to foreign competition may rely on their investments in
R & D activities that may dictate the rate at which rms can add or drop their products and
eventually be able to churn their products. Switching products can involve payment of xed
1Firms add products by introducing new products to their product range. Firms can drop products by i)
discontinuing selling the product ii) outsourcing the production to another producer. However, as all rms
considered are manufacturing rms, we remove the possibility that rms would purchase from other suppliers
only to resell the products. The product range includes all products produced within the rm. An outsourced
product is considered as a product dropped from internal production. Approximately 48% of the rms that drop
products from internal production are outsourcing their products.
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costs related to addition of new products as this may require purchase of new equipment and
facilities2 . Further, cannibalizationor dropping old products may entail equipment, facilities
and certain employees to become redundant and the costs related to lost knowledge of production
associated with the dropped product. Several rms may prefer to produce a more e¤ective
product range but may only be able to a¤ord the xed costs needed to add new products only
or drop old products only rather than churn products, a product switching activity that may
require payments related to xed costs of both addition of new products and dropping of old
products. I test the main hypothesis that the e¤ect of the pressure from foreign competition on
the decision to (i) introduce new products and (ii) on production costs inuences rms to churn
products rather than undertake other product switching activities.
Bernard et al (2010) is the seminal paper that extends the basic Melitz (2003) model as they
relate rm characteristics of multi-product rms to their strategy of product switching. Using
the data collected in the Census of Manufactures by the US Census Bureau, they analyze product
switching activities within rms by dividing the rms into mutually exclusive groups based on
the strategy of product switching. The four groups are similar to the ones that are listed in this
paper, namely (i) rms that do not undertake any product switching activities, ii) rms that
add products only, iii) rms that drop products only iv) rms that churn products. Bernard
et al (2010) focus on the e¤ects of rm characteristics on product switching activities as they
determine that rm characteristics such as rm size, age and productivity favor the decision of
rms to add products, while they negatively inuence the decision of rms to drop products. In
addition, they also consider product characteristics such as scale and age dependence of products.
I add to Bernard et al (2010) as I consider the e¤ect of foreign competition on the decision to
introduce new products and on the production costs on rms that switch their products.
The exposure to foreign competition and its e¤ect on multi-product rms has been a focus
of a few recent studies as they consider the relationship between the volume of exports and the
number of goods exported due to trade liberalization episodes between trading countries. Bas
and Bombarda (2011) consider the e¤ects of market access expansion and foreign competitive
pressures using data on French rms that export to China as they study the e¤ect of trade
2Switching products is dened as: i) churning products (adding and dropping of products), ii) adding products
only, iii) dropping products only. The excluded group of rms undertakes no product switching activities.
2
liberalization experienced in relation to Chinas process of joining the WTO. With the Herndahl
index computed over all products exported by rms as a proxy for foreign competition, Bas and
Bombarda (2011) nd that the increase in foreign competition reduces the volume and the
number of products exported by rms. Similarly, Abraham and Van Hove (2010) consider
the e¤ect of competition on Belgian products from Asian producers in foreign markets. They
determine that Belgian rms have expanded the sales of higher quality products as a result
of competition, particularly from Chinese rms. On the other hand, Iavocone and Javorcik
(2010) determine that Mexican rms which exported newer products are less likely to survive
in the market and that new exporters begin with limited varieties expand their product scope
of exported goods over the number of years. As rms expand their product varieties exported
over time, it can imply that rms are likely to generate export revenue that allows them to
improve productivity levels and in turn pay the related xed costs to undertake product switching
activities.
Mayer et al (2011) show the e¤ect of di¤erences in competition across export markets on the
skewness of the products exported by rms. Tougher competition increases the relative share of
products that perform better or are located closer to the core competency level of rms. Mayer
et al (2011) suggest that competition increases the price elasticity of the demand curve, which
can subsequently lead to a relatively higher demand of the product closer to core competency at
constant relative prices. Firms are likely to allocate their production towards core competency
as they add products that are better performing, while they drop products that are likely to
be further away from core competency. Mayer et al (2011) determine that French exporters
are likely to skew their exports towards their best performing products. However, Iavocone and
Javorcik (2010) suggest that the volatility to introduce and discontinue products associated with
rm entry and exit from export markets by rms in developing countries, such as Mexico, is
greater relative to the volatility faced in developed and advanced countries by rms that churn
product.
Trade liberalization exposes rms to the pressure of foreign competitors as it allows the
presence of foreign goods within a home market as well as allows exporters to compete in a
foreign market. Feenstra and Ma (2008) discuss the e¤ects of trade liberalization on the product
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scope of rms. As trade liberalization occurs it can cause an e¤ect on the variety of products
produced by rms as they become more exposed to competition. With the cannibalization
e¤ectand homogeneous marginal costs across products, the market size is increased through
liberalization, which can lead to the number of rms to fall and an expansion of the product
range by the rms. However, with marginal costs varying between products, the number of rms
that survive may be insensitive to market size, the products introduced by rms may increase
on average for each rms. Eckel and Neary (2010) use the concept of core competency for the
product that is produced the most e¤ectively by rms, with rms producing less of each product
that is further away from their core competency. With globalization, competition increases the
productivity level within rms, which may cause rms to drop products away from the core
competency, while add products closer to their core competency.
Eckel et al (2010) introduce the concept of quality-based competence and cost-based compe-
tence as rms choose a conguration of their product range that maximizes their prots. They
suggest that rms either invest in a product range that exhibits core competency with high
marginal costs and high quality or low marginal costs aimed to provide consumers with cheaper
products. If rms concentrate on quality-based competence, they are likely to invest in gener-
ating higher markups as a result of quality di¤erentiation of the products. Aw and Lee (2009)
show that the Taiwanese electronic rms drop products that are farthest from the core compe-
tency and improvements of the market performance of the plants is linked to the readjustments
by rms to the production of their core competent products. As foreign competition inuences
the product range of rms, I incorporate a similar idea as I determine whether rms that are
exposed to pressure from foreign competition churn products rather than add new products
only, drop old products only, and do not undertake any product switching activities. I take into
account whether rms move towards core competency as they adjust their product range. The
inuence from the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new
product or on production costs will change the number of products produced as rms add and
drop products. In addition, rms can also churn products. Firms that churn products are likely
to move closer to their core competency but the e¤ect of the pressure from foreign competition
on quality-based competence and cost-based competence can have varying e¤ects on the type
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of competency rms may achieve.
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) conducted surveys on
rms in 27 CEEC and Central Asian countries3 . This dataset, by the World Bank, is borrowed
to study the impact of the e¤ect of the pressure from foreign competition on the decision to
introduce new products and on production costs on the di¤erent activities related to product
switching. Ayyagari et al (2011), using a similar dataset, nd that the pressure of foreign com-
petition on production costs rather than that of domestic competition and customers positively
a¤ect the decision of rms to introduce a new product line, which is similar to the result I
present in this paper. Gorodnichenko et al (2008) use the same dataset as in this paper, but for
a separate set of years, to determine whether globalization induces pressure on domestic rms
to introduce new products within the same sample of countries. Gorodnichenko et al (2008) use
various characteristics to dene particular types of rms on the basis of their productivity-level
di¤erences between rms, di¤erences in the age of rms and their exposure to di¤erent levels of
corruption to determine whether foreign competition drives innovation within rms. The major
di¤erence between Gorodnichenko et al (2008) and my study is that the former consider addition
or upgrade of product lines, new production technology and new accreditation rather than the
possibility to switch products as they either add products only, or drop products only or churn
products within their product range as a source of innovation by the rms.
Atkeson and Burstein (2007), Aw et al (2008), Constantini and Melitz (2008) and Aw et al
(2009) consider the role of investments in R & D activities and export participation to increase
the productivity levels of rms. In addition, Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and Treer (2010)
consider the role of export revenue generated by exporters to invest in higher technology, which
subsequently increases productivity levels of rms. This suggests the complementarity nature
of investing in advanced inputs, by either importing high technology inputs or investing in R
& D activities, and export participation activities. Such investments increase the productivity
levels of rms and consequently allow such rms to invest in subsequent improvements of their
product range to achieve greater competency levels. Similarly, investments to increase the
3There are a total of 7288 observations recorded, with 3,600 rms surveyed in 2005 and 3,688 rms surveyed
in 2009. There are 6,628 unique rms surveyed in either 2005 or 2009. Some rms were surveyed in 2005 as well
as 2009. I only consider surveys for rms in manufacturing industries within ISIC Rev 3.1 15 to 37. Observations
believed to be inaccurate by the interviewers are dropped.
5
knowledge base of rms in terms of hiring educated or skillful workforce can subsequently increase
the productivity levels of rms. Di¤erent activities of product switching require rms to pay
xed costs related to investments undertaken or forgone ( in terms of dropping products), such
as R & D and creation of blueprint or replacing redundant equipment and labor, with rms
that churn products likely to undertake the greatest payment of xed costs4 . The intensity of
contractual agreements between the buyers and the sellers can dictate whether rms will produce
goods that are either di¤erentiated or homogeneous and determine whether rms will invest in
either quality-based or cost-based competence. Industries that require contract agreements will
be more likely to have rms produce di¤erentiated products. Such rms may focus more on
quality-based competence rather than cost-based competence as greater di¤erentiation between
products may reduce the amount of price competition between rms. Therefore, industries
that are characterized by high contract intensity may have rms within them to be more likely
impacted by the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new
products than on production costs. Vice versa results may be observed for rms within industries
characterized by low contract intensity, in which price competition between rms can play a
role on inuencing the product switching activities of rms. Categorizing rms according to
their productivity levels, constraints due to the lack of supply of adequately educated labor,
and the contract intensive nature of the industry, I determine whether the inuence of foreign
competition on product switching activities varies across such subgroups.
Theoretical Background
The theoretical model used below is borrowed from Bernard et al (2010), Mayer et al (2011),
Brambilla et al (2009) and Allanson and Montagna (2005). These models integrate a multi-
product framework into the single product model on heterogeneous rms using the standard
monopolistic competition assumption. For simplicity, the model below is based on a static one
period model, where rms receive a shock from foreign competitors that can spillover onto the
decision of rms on their product switching activities through channels that improve productivity
4Product churning will require greater xed costs than any other of the activities as it involves rms to pay
xed costs to add products as well as drop products. If such xed costs are paid, it can imply that rms are
improving the e¢ ciency of their product range by replacing products that are produced less e¤ectively.
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such as investments in R & D projects, inputs embedded with higher technology, or more
educated and skilled workers5 . Firms are likely to switch products as they face a greater price
elasticity of demand for all products as their consumers have access to greater variety of products.
Firms that churn products add new products into their product range, while at the same
time drop old products that become more ine¢ cient to produce. However, rms maintain their
production of the baseline product range which can be benchmarked at their core competency.
Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al (2011) describe the baseline product as the product
which provides the greatest value to their customers. Multiple product rms may have one
product at their core competency, while several other products that are inferior to their core
competency. Addition of new products can occur due to investments in R & D activities and
improvements in productivity levels, which can spur rms to churn products. Bustos (2011)
suggests that trade liberalization process allows exporting rms to increase their export revenues
which is subsequently invested in technology that incorporates higher quality inputs which results
in greater productivity levels for rms. Trade liberalization episodes increase the exposure to
competition from foreign goods as rms either expand their sales into foreign markets or face
greater competition from foreign goods within the home market. Firms that invest in R & D
activities and participate in export activities, or expand their knowledge base by being able
to employ a highly educated workforce are likely to generate higher productivity levels that
promote subsequent undertaking of product switching activities.
The utility function is dened as:
U = (C
 1

B +
Z N
0
C
 1

i di)

 1
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across products. CB is the baseline product,
while Ci is the composite for the other products that have been introduced by rms over time.
The products, i > 0 is dened as:
Ci = (
Z ni
0
((())cj)
 1
 dj)

 1 ; i 2 [0; N ]
5 It is important to note that initial productivity levels of rms will dictate whether they undertake investments
in R & D activities or invest in higher technology. This is more specically discussed in Aw et al (2009).
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where ni is the number of varieties, () indicates the quality (quality, , is an increasing
function of productivity, ), of the variety indexed by j; or the consumer tasteof each variety
within the product produced. The parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties
within products.  is larger than 6 : For the purpose of this paper, the quality of each product
can be aggregated by the quality of varieties within each product. Therefore, the quality of
varieties within products will determine the quality of the product range of the rms. Similar
to Bernard at al (2010), () is the demand parameter that represents the relative demand by
consumers for varieties of the same product across di¤erent rms. Firms that provide greater
quality of varieties within products are also likely to obtain greater sales of their products
relative to other rms. Firms that add products to their product range will add additional
varieties within those specic products, while rms that drop products will also drop the related
varieties of the product as well. Eckel et al (2010) introduce the option of rms to focus on
either cost-based competence or quality-based competence, with the former likely to increase
the marginal costs as they move away from their core competency product and the latter likely
to decrease the marginal costs but increase product quality. The increase in quality of products
comes at the cost of an increase in the marginal costs of production. Dhingra (2010) and Bas
and Bombarda (2011) discuss the e¤ects of trade liberalization episodes on the pressure from
foreign competition. In turn, the degree of pressure from foreign competition can induce rms
to produce at either cost-based competence or quality-based competence.
I also assume that the total cost is an increasing function of the number of products rms
produce, with the baseline quantity being produced at the lowest total cost.
The baseline product with multiple varieties, j is dened as:
C0 = (
Z n0
0
c
 1

j dj)

 1 , i 2 (0; N ]
The e¤ect of pressure from competitors may lead to changes in consumer tastes, which
may require rms to undertake product switching activities. However, rms that will drop their
baseline variety will cease to exist. On the other hand, all rms that either add or drop products
6Although, the elasticity of substitution between varieties is greater than that across products, we do not rule
out the cannibalization e¤ect across products as rms can still substitute one product over another. However, it
will be less costly for a rm to substitute within products and between varieties.
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will also have incurred the initial xed cost fNP to enter the industry. Firms that either add new
products or drop old products pay additional xed costs, fAP and fDP respectively. For instance,
rms that add products with multiple varieties may be required to invest in new technologies
necessary, while rms that drop products with multiple varieties may be required to pay xed
costs towards the displacement of equipment and workers associated with the production of
the dropped products. For the purpose of simplicity, fAP = fDP and the xed cost to churn
products is fAP + fDP = fCP:
The probability of product churning should increase with the productivity levels of rms.
The quality or e¢ ciency of products produced is an increasing function of productivity. An
increase in productivity levels will lower production costs, particularly important for rms that
prefer cost-based competence. Hence, shocks to productivity can a¤ect the dynamic nature of
the rms as they churn their products. For instance, rms that receive a positive productivity
shock are also likely to make investments towards improving the e¢ ciency of products within
the product range, even though they are moving further away from their baseline variety. Aw
and Lee (2009) suggest that rms will drop products that are farthest away from their core set
of products. Firms would use the opportunity to drop products in favor of producing products
that can be more e¤ectively produced and subsequently improve performance of rms.
Using a derivation similar to Brambilla (2009), the price function is the standard markup
over marginal cost:
pj(; ) =
1

where  =  1 : The initial productivity level is exogenously given to rms.
The aggregate price function is:
P = (P 1 0 +
Z N
0
P 1 i di)
1
1 
where P0 is the aggregate price for baseline variety and the Pi is the aggregate price for the
products introduced.
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Pi = (
Z ni
0
(())p1 j dj)
1
1  ; i 2 (0; N ]
The prot function of a product variety j within each product i can be expressed as:
j(; (); Pi; P ) =
 1

(())

 1P i P
 1y   fj
which can also be expressed more simply as:
j(; (); PiP ) = j(; (); Pi; P )  fj
where fj is the variety-level xed cost used to produce and promote each variety within the
products. The e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on rms will likely result in changes
in productivity dynamics of rms that may induce them to either increase their product range
by adding new products, decrease their product range by dropping old products or maintain
their product range by churning products. I determine the value associated to each product
switching activity below. Given the price indices, rms receive a larger value if they exhibit
higher productivity levels as such rms can pay greater up-front xed costs.
Firms that do not undertake any product dynamics will value themselves as VNP , if they
produce i products.
VNP = (i)(j(; (); Pi; P )  fj)  fNP
with i > 0: fNP is the xed cost associated with the basic operation of the rms and is
incurred by all rms that add, drop and churn products.
Firms that add m products with j varieties to their range of products will have a value of
VAP ;if they produce i+m products.
VAP = (i+m)(j(; (); Pi; P )  fj)  fAP   fNP
Firms that drop k products with j varieties from their range of products will have a value
of VDP ; if they produce i  k products.
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VDP = (i  k)(j(; (); Pi; P )  fj)  fDP   fNP
where i  k  0
Firms that add and drop products will have a value of VCP , if they produce i + m   k
products.
VCP = (i+m  k)j(; ()Pi; P ) = (i+m  k)j(; (); Pi; P )  fj)
 fCP   fNP
with fCP = fAP+DP : For simplicity, each number of product i;m and n have the same
number of varieties j.
I assume VNP > 0 in order for rms to enter the industry and produce greater than just
the baseline product. Firms will prefer to churn products than add products only and drop
products only if VCP > VAP ; VDP : I further assume VAP ' VDP as addition of products increases
total revenue which compensates for the increase in total xed costs related to this activity,
while dropping products may reduce costs of production associated with the varieties dropped,
it can also reduce the revenues associated with the dropped products. Similarly, rms will
undertake one of the product switching activities if (i) VCP > VAP; (ii) VCP > VDP and (iii)
VAP ; VDP > VNP : Therefore, I can rank the values as VCP > VAP ; VDP > VNP > 0 if rms
churn products rather than undertake other product switching activities.
Mayer et al (2011) notes that consumers have a love for variety, which can be within
products as well as across products. Holding prices constant, welfare increases as the number
of products increases. Firms may increase total costs of production as they add products with
improved e¢ ciency to their product range that also generates an increase in their welfare.
As xed costs to either add products or drop products are assumed to be similar, the love
for varietyby the consumers can compensate for the increase in total costs for rms that add
products. Firms that drop products will reduce their total costs of production, while considering
the revenue forgone of the product dropped is minimal for rms as the dropped product is the
11
farthest from core competency of rms.
The pressure from foreign competition may induce rms to undertake product switching
activities as they may get inclined to invest in R & D activities and export participation in order
to increase productivity levels necessary to purchase the technology and inputs needed to achieve
greater competency in their production. The testable implication for this theoretical model is
that the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products
and on production costs inuences rms to churn products rather than undertake other product
switching activities.
If rms believe that the value to churn products, VCP , is larger than the value to undertake
the other product switching activities, VAP and VDP , the pressure from foreign competition
should inuence rms to churn products rather than undertake the other product switching
activities. As product switching activities entail varying up-front payments of xed costs,
certain rms may not be inuenced by the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition due to
constraints related to their rm and industry characteristics, such as lower productivity levels
that do not support investments in R & D activities and export participation or the shortage of
adequately educated labor relative to other rms within their industry or the nature of contract
intensity of their industry.
The Data
The Enterprise Surveys, by the World Bank, which provide the extensive rm level data used is
commonly known as the BEEPS dataset in the Central and Eastern European and Central Asian
countries7 . It is created jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. In Appendix A, I list the names of the countries. There are 7,288 observations
for 27 countries, with 3,600 surveys conducted in 2005 and 3,688 surveys conducted in 2009. The
rms included in this study only pertain to the manufacturing sector, ISIC Rev 3.1 sectors 15
to 37, although service sector rms were also surveyed in BEEPS. The sample includes mainly
small and medium sized rms with less than 10,000 employees, with approximately 50 percent
7Enterprise surveys are available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. As with every survey, some data
collected was marked as being doubtful by the interviewers, as the accuracy of the data collected is ranked. I
have eliminated any observations that have been marked as doubtful by the interviewer.
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of the rms have less than 35 employees and 75 percent have less than 110 employees. It also
includes rms that are located in large cities as well as rural areas. One of the major benets of
this survey is that self-reported variables are listed for various types of activities rms undertake
related to international trade, competition and innovation.
The survey allows a creation of a variable that determines whether rms churn products,
add products only, and drop products only. For instance, rms are asked whether they have
introduced new products in the last 3 years, discontinued at least one product in the last 3
years or outsourced production activity that was previously conducted in-house during the last
3 years. The rst variable denes the decision of rms to add products, while the latter two
variables dene the decision of rms to drop products from internal production.
[Figure 1 about here]
In Figure 1, I list the percentages of rms that undertake various activities related to product
switching. However, the dataset does not provide details on whether rms have a net gain of
products or a net loss of products8 .
[Figure 2 about here]
The dataset provides a list of other variables that are useful to this study. The main in-
dependent variables are the indicators that dene the impact of the pressure of competition,
foreign and domestic, and customers on the introduction of new products and on the production
costs9 . Firms rank the pressure as 1, 2, 3 and 4. Firms that rank the pressure as 1 indicate that
the pressure is not all important to them, while rms that rank the pressure as 4 indicate that
the pressure is very important to them. A dummy variable is constructed using these variables
with 0 indicates rms that consider pressure to be not important at all or slightly important ( 1
8 It is interesting to note that Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) observe the percentage of rms that introduce
new export varieties to gradually decrease after the trade liberalization period. The percentages of rms that
drop varieties or churn varieties remain constant and is much lower than the initial percentage of rms that add
varieties.
9Although, the export status and import status of rms can be highly correlated with pressure from foreign
competition, it is likely that there are foreign rms located within the national market that contribute to this
pressure. Roughly 40% of the non-exporters report pressure from foreign competition, and 35% of the non-
importers report pressure from foreign competition. Further, about 31% of the rms that do not participate in
any international trading activity are a¤ected by pressure from foreign competition. This implies the presence
of foreign rms and products within the national market as it a¤ects approximately one-third of the rms that
neither import nor export.
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and 2 on the scale of rank of pressure), while 1 indicates that rms consider pressure to be fairly
important or very important ( 3 and 4 on the scale of rank of pressure). In Figure 2, I plot the
distribution of the indicator on pressure from foreign competition for rms that consider it to be
fairly or very important. As I consider two di¤erent indicators on pressure, on the introduction
of new products and on the production costs, it is important to separate the two variables and
use them in separate regressions to avoid the issue of multicollinearity10 . For instance, rms
that consider the impact of pressure on introduction of new products to be important can also
have similar considerations for the impact of pressure on production costs. There are several
rms that can be a¤ected by the pressure to improve quality as well as cut production costs (in
terms of marginal costs of production).
In Appendix B, I list the other control variables used in the dataset. The purpose of these
variables is to control for whether rms are domestic or foreign-owned, conduct their own in
house R & D activities, the size of the rms by considering the number of full-time production
workers and the output each worker generates. It also considers whether rms have vertical
linkages with foreign rms or customers by either exporting their nal product or importing
their inputs from a foreign source. Bustos (2011) determines revenues from exporters as an
important channel for rms to nance the xed costs related to the undertaking of the adoption of
higher and improved technology after a trade liberalization episode involving the home country.
Further, the indicators also control for the capacity utilized by current production, whether rms
have their assets nanced by bank loans, provides labor quality improvement opportunities to
their workers by having them participate in formal training programs and the composition of
highly educated labor by accounting for the percentage of employees with a university degree.
Product churning should be correlated with market access and be more likely to be under-
taken by rms located in the more developed and advanced markets where products produced
by rms are likely to have greater demand. Therefore, Appendix C determines the relationship
between the GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) of a country and the country level averages
10The dummy variables on the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the introduction of new products
and the pressure from foreign competition on the production costs reveal a correlation of about 75%. Only
about 12% of the rms do not record higher pressure from foreign competition to introduce new products or on
production costs if the other does, and vice versa. This shows that rms that face high pressure from one e¤ect
is likely to record high pressure from the other e¤ect as well.
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of rms that churn products rather than not undertaking any product switching activities, add
products only and drop products only11 . It is observed that the relationship is positive across
the three activities. In Appendix D, I correlate the impact of the pressure from foreign competi-
tion on the decision on introduction of new products and on production costs respectively with
the GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) of each country in the sample. Again, as predicted, I
see a positive relationship between pressure from foreign competition at the country level and
the GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). Firms that are exposed to foreign markets due to the
membership of their home country in the European Union (EU) also observe greater e¤ect of
pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products and on production
costs12 .
Results
OLS and Probit Estimations
Firm level characteristics are regressed with di¤erent trading activities, which can be expressed
in the following equation:
Zijct = 1ADDONLYijc(t 3;t) + 2DROPONLYijc(t 3;t) + 3CHURNijc(t 3;t)
+t + j + c + "ijct
where Zijct is the rm characteristics, and dummies ADDONLYijc(t 3;t) are rms that add
products only, DROPONLYijc(t 3;t) are rms that drop products only, CHURNijc(t 3;t) are
rms that churn products only during the last 3 years, t is the year dummies, c is time-
invariant country dummy, j is 3 digit ISIC (Rev 3.1) industry dummy, and "ijct is the error
term. The purpose of this estimation is to determine the correlation between various product
11The data for the GDP per capita (Constant 2000 US$) is borrowed from the World Development Indicators
by the World Bank.
12The countries that joined the EU in 2004 are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
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switching activities and rm characteristics as is done in Bernard et al (2010). This is an impor-
tant contribution as it will help to determine whether rms that drop products only reveal similar
correlation with rm characteristics as rms participating in other product switching activities.
The results to the regressions that estimate the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition are
reported later in the section13 .
[Table 1 about here]
In Table 1 , I observe that rms which churn products to signicantly inuence all rm
characteristics compared to rms that do not undertake any product switching activities as
their counterparts. Domestic rms and capacity utilization are negatively inuenced, while the
other rm characteristics are positively inuenced. Firms that add products only are similar
to rms that do not undertake any product switching activities in terms of the number of
full-time production workers, capacity utilization and age of rms as these variables are not
signicantly a¤ected by the decision of rms to add products to their product range or increase
their varieties of products. On the other hand, rms that drop products only from their product
range or reduce their varieties of products are similar to rms that do not undertake any product
switching activities in terms of their domestic ownership, full-time production workers, sales per
worker and percentage of employees with a university degree.
The main observation in Table 1 is that rms which undertake any one of the product
switching activities correlate with rm characteristics similarly. That is, if rms add products
only or drop products only, their correlation on rm characteristics do not di¤er in terms of the
direction of the e¤ect. With such a result, I can assume that rms that add products only or
drop products only are likely to incur xed costs similar to rms that churn products and that
the product switching activities are related to the improvement of rm level characteristics. This
result is di¤erent than that reported in Bernard et al (2010) as they determine that rms that
drop products (net) are oppositely correlated with rm level characteristics such as change in
real output and change in employment levels compared to rms that add products (net) to their
product range. As Bernard et al (2010) focus on the US data, this di¤erence can be explained
13All results, except under the instrumental variable section, are calculated as the marginal e¤ects at the mean
values of the independent variables.
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by the fact that the US rms face lower barriers to entry, are typically smaller and face lower
constraints in terms of labor relations than rms in the Central and Eastern Europe and Central
Asia. Firms in the US may drop products more frequently compared to rms in my dataset as
their products become less protable. In addition, this di¤erence in results can also be a result
of subsidies to protected products by the governments in the CEEC and Central Asian countries
which may not necessarily result in the drop of production as protability of rms fall. Further,
there is a positive correlation between rms that add products and rms that drop products as
rms that churn products reveal better rm level characteristics. This emphasizes the fact that
there is a reallocation of resources within rms as rms may face external pressure rather than
a reallocation of resources across rms. Bernard et al (2010) reveal a similar result for add and
drop rates at the product-level. This is an important nding as it can determine the signicance
of the impact of pressure from foreign competition on the performance of rms.
[Figure 3 about here]
In Figure 3, I observe that rms which churn products are likely to outperform rms that
undertake other product switching activities and not undertake any product switching activity.
In addition, all rms that undertake any of the activities related to product switching record
generally better rm characteristics than rms that do not undertake any of the activities. Only
the indicators on domestic ownership of rms and capacity utilization appear to be similar.
In Table 2, I report the regression of di¤erent activities related to product switching activities,
expressed in the following equation:
Y ijc(t;t 3) = 1PRESSFOR

ijct + 2Zijct + t + j + c + "ijct
where Y ijc(t;t 3) is the dummy variable related to product switching. Firms that churn
products are assigned a value of 1, while the counterpart activities, which include rms that
do not undertake any product switching activities, add products only and drop products only,
are assigned a value of 0. PRESSFORijct is the dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if
the pressure from foreign competition is either fairly important or very important and a value
of 0 if the pressure is not important or slightly important. I assume that Y takes the form
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Pr(Y = 1jX) = (X 0): The "ijct  N(0; 1): I consider two blocks of regressions based on the
e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products and on
the decision on production costs respectively, with the former likely to determine the pressure
on preference of rms for quality-based competence and the latter for pressure on the preference
of rms for cost-based competence14 . It is important to note that preference of rms on the
quality-based competence and the cost-based competence both require investments in upgrading
production technology and introduction of new production techniques. The other notations are
as listed previously above.
[Table 2 about here]
In Table 2, I present the results of the probit estimation with PRESSFORijct as dummy
variables. The e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new
products has a positive and signicant impact at the 1% level on the probability that rms will
churn products rather than not undertake any of the product switching activities and add new
products only, but such an impact is not observed for rms that are likely to churn products
rather than drop products only. The e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision
on production costs has a positive and signicant impact on the probability that the rm will
churn products rather than not undertake any product switching activities at the 5% level of
signicance and on the probability that the rm will churn products rather than add products
only is signicant at the 1% level. There is again no signicant impact of the pressure from for-
eign competition on the decision on production costs to increase the likelihood that the rm will
churn products rather than drop products only. This indicates that rms which drop products
only do not face signicantly greater pressure from foreign competition on both introduction of
new products as well as production costs, implying that pressure from foreign competition does
not induce rms to reduce varieties rather than invest in improving the e¢ ciency of their product
range by churning products. The dummy on R&D, import status, formal training of employees
14The survey is devised to take into account the two e¤ects of pressure from competition, where pressure on
quality-based competence can be separated from pressure on cost-based competence. However, several individual
rms can report importance to both types of pressure, which can lead to collinearity issues if regressed in one
equation. The empirical strategy I employ separates the two variables into di¤erent regressions and determines
the inuence each of the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition has on the decision of rms to churn their
products.
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and percentage of employees with a university degree signicantly impact the decision of rms
to churn products against all three activities, determining the importance of these investments
to product switching activities. Additionally, this indicates that it is not just investments in R &
D projects that a¤ect product switching activities, but investments in complementary assets are
also important. However, the export status and nancial leverage positively impacts rms that
drop products only to churn products, while not inuence rms that add products only. This
can imply that rms which borrow from banks and export their products are also likely to add
new products instead of just drop their old products or not undertake any product switching
activities. On the other hand, capacity utilization has a negative e¤ect on the likelihood that
rms will churn products rather than add new products only to their product range and not
undertake any product switching activities. If capacity utilization is a proxy for demand of a
product, this is an indication that rms are likely to add products only and not undertake any
product switching activities instead of churn products when faced with greater demand for their
products.
The basic result from the probit estimation is that foreign competition does a¤ect certain
product switching activities, particularly if rms are to churn products. However, it does reveal
varying impact of foreign competition between rms that undertake di¤erent activities. For
instance, there is no signicant impact of both proxies of foreign competition on rms that churn
products against rms that just drop old products. This implies that foreign competition does
not play a role in determining the decision of rms to churn their products rather than drop a
product only from their product range. This also suggests that the impact of foreign competition
on the decision to introduce new products and on production costs increases the likelihood that
rms which expand their product range may instead churn products, while rms that reduce
their varieties of products are not likely to churn products. If rms that churn products are
likely to increase their e¢ ciency at which a product range is produced, rms that add varieties
only instead move towards a more e¤ective product range similar to their core competency
level. The fact that pressure from foreign competition fails to inuence rms to churn products
rather than drop products only signies that exposure to foreign competition leads to product
churning activities only for selected rms that undertake certain product switching activities.
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The insignicance of the pressure from foreign competition after holding variables that account
for productivity and rm performance constant explains the lack of impact of pressure from
foreign competition on rms to churn products rather than drop products only. It will be
interesting to determine whether the pressure from foreign competition is likely to inuence
product churning within rms that invest in R & D activities and participate as exporters as
such rms can exhibit greater productivity levels with their ability to generate greater revenue.
Robustness CheckInstrumental Variable Estimation
The probit estimation can reveal inconsistent and biased results as it may not take into account
the problems with potential endogeneity of the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competitors. The
excluded instrument used in the rst stage regression is the measure on obstacle from customs
and trade regulation. Firms that record greater obstacles from customs and trade regulation are
likely to face greater costs to export their nal product to and import their inputs from a foreign
country. The obstacles from customs and trade regulation may increase trade costs and create
trade friction that can as a result lead to greater pressure from foreign competitors. Although,
trade liberalization procedures between trading partners can reduce trade costs, certain obstacles
from customs and trade regulations can still exist at the rm level and inuence the e¤ect of
pressure from foreign competition. Firms that face greater constraints are likely to face greater
pressure from foreign competitors as the products they sell or their imports of foreign inputs
will be more expensive to procure. Aghion et al (2005) use policy instruments as excluded
instruments to control for the endogeneity of competition, which is similar to the strategy
adopted in this paper. Gorodnichenko et al (2008) use instruments that a¤ect the entry of rms
into the market, as competition may be inuenced by the constraints of setting up business. As
the obstacle to trade is more likely to a¤ect domestic rms rather than foreign rms, it will lower
the market size for the domestic rms, while potentially increasing the market size available to
foreign rms within the international and national markets. The obstacles from customs and
trade regulation will impact the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decisions to
introduce new products and on the production costs, which should in turn inuence the product
switching activities of rms.
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The rst stage regression is:
Pr(PRESSFORijct = 1) = 1OBSTRADEijct + 2Zijct + t + j + c + vijct
where OBSTRADEijct is the obstacle from trade regulations and customs rms may face
ranked as no obstacles to very severe obstacles. vijct is the error term associated with the
rst-stage regression.
The second stage regression is:
Pr(Y ijc(t 3;t) = 1) = 1PRESSFOR

ijct + 2Zijct + t + j + c + "ijct
[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
The instrumental variable estimations result in an insignicant relationship between the
endogenous variable and the dependent variable in the second stage regressions as is observed
in Tables 3 and 4. Further, there is a negative and signicant impact, at the 10% level, of
both indicators on foreign competition for rms that drop products only. The negative e¤ect
can be explained by the correlation of the excluded instrument on the endogenous regressor. If
obstacles to trade strongly inuence the pressure from foreign competition, the tted value of
pressure from foreign competition can result in having a negative e¤ect on the product churning
activities of rms. With the standard errors much larger for the endogenous regressors in the
instrumental variable estimations, the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition may not have a
signicant e¤ect on product churning activities as is observed in the probit estimations for rms
that churn products rather than add products only and not undertake any product switching
activities. Further, the excluded instruments can be considered valid as a high F-statistic for
the weak instrument test and a signicant outcome at the 1% level for the underidentication
tests is observed for all the regressions. Inclusion of the export status, import status and
capacity utilization as controls in the rst stage regression does not reduce the power of the
aforementioned tests. This determines that the excluded instrument signicantly inuences the
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endogenous variables in the rst stage regressions and reveals explanatory power, even after
other rm level characteristics are used as controls.
With the failure to reject the tests for exogeneity in each of the regressions, the instrumental
variable estimations are consistent but ine¢ cient, while the probit estimations are consistent and
e¢ cient. One explanation for this result is that it is unlikely that product switching activities
themselves can inuence the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition if the goal of the rms
is to provide best value to their customers at the lowest marginal cost or at the best possible
quality within their industry. In addition, as investments in R & D o¤er some sort of market
power for the rms, it will not be optimal for rms to increase the e¤ect of pressure from foreign
competition as a result of switching products.
A similar strategy of instrumental variable estimation (not reported) reveals similar results
using excluded instruments on obstacles to entry into business as suggested by Gorodnichenko
et al (2008). However, the obstacles to business entry such as obtaining permits and licenses
reported in the rst stage regression reduce the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition
instead.
Including Pressure From Domestic Competition and Customers
It is important to control for the e¤ect of pressure from domestic competitors and customers on
the decision to introduce new products and on production costs as well. There are possibilities
of spillover e¤ects between domestic rms that cannot be determined by the e¤ect of pressure
from foreign competition. In addition, pressure from customers can determine the strategy of
rms related to product switching. It is necessary to include pressure from domestic competitors
and customers into a regression. For instance, a dairy product rm in central Russia that also
exports to nearby Central Asian countries, can be the only producer in the whole region but it
may face competition from similar rms located near Moscow that sell their products to this
region as well as from customers located in other regions of Russia. Given the competitive
nature of an industry, it is important to isolate pressure from domestic competitors as well as
customers in order to obtain the signicance of the e¤ect of foreign competitors on the decision
to introduce new products and on production costs.
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[Table 5 about here]
In Table 5, I observe that the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to
introduce new products is signicant at the 1% level for rms that churn products rather than
not undertake any product switching activities and add products only15 . The e¤ect of pressure
from domestic competition is signicant at the 10% level for the former category of product
switching. On the other hand, there is no signicant impact on the probability that rms that
reduce their varieties of products only are likely to churn products due to the e¤ect of pressure
from foreign competitors on either the decision to introduce new products or on production costs.
Further, the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision on production costs does
not signicantly impact the probability that rms churn products rather than not undertake
any product switching activities and drop products only. The e¤ect of pressure from customers
on the decision on production costs signicantly inuences the former at the 5% level, while the
e¤ect of pressure from domestic competition signicantly inuences the latter at 5% level. I do
obtain a positive and signicant impact at the 5% level on the probability that rms will churn
products rather than add products only as it faces the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition
on the decision on their production costs. The pressure from customers on production costs is
also signicant at 10% level for such rms. This basically implies the e¤ect of pressure from
foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products on rms that churn their products
rather than not undertake any product switching activities and add products only. However,
the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision on production costs is subtle for
rms that are likely to churn products rather than add products only.
Firm Characteristics and Pressure
The following analysis distributes rms according to their knowledge-capital enhancing abilities
such as investments in R & D activities and export participation and constraints faced due to an
inadequately educated workforce. For the latter categorization, the rms are distributed with
15The variables on competition can be strongly correlated to each other, which could cause problems related
to multicollinearity within the listed variables in a regression. However, after testing for the ination of the
variance, through the variance ination factor (vif), the problem of multicollinearity of the control variables is
not a major issue.
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respect to the median at the four digit industry level, with rms that face a greater constraint
due to the uneducated labor listed as not possessing adequately educated labor16 . In-house R
& D activities mainly involve introduction of new and improved technology by rms to assist
e¢ cient production of their product range and is considered a major source of innovation.
Firms can introduce new products by employing more educated and knowledgeable workforce
to complement R & D activities, which can increase their desire for more adequately educated
labor. In addition, investments in R & D activities and export participation can favor increases
in their productivity. It is predicted that the more productive rms are likely to churn products
and move towards core competency if they are exposed to the e¤ect of pressure from foreign
competition on the decision to introduce new products and on production costs as such rms
can a¤ord the xed costs related to product switching activities. Similarly, rms that are not
constrained by uneducated labor and have employees that are relatively more mobile towards the
production of skilled intensive products are likely to churn products as they face pressure from
foreign competition. Therefore, I will observe the relationship between pressure from foreign
competition and the decision to churn products rather than undertake various product switching
activities in Table 6 to Table 9. The number of observations of product switching activities and
pressure from foreign competition per rm level characteristics is listed in Appendix E.
R & D Activities and Export Participation
Atkeson and Burstein (2007) discuss the impact of reduced marginal trade costs on product and
process innovation of rms as exporting rms can benet by the learning e¤ect. Aw et al (2009)
determine that rms which undertake both R & D activities and participate in export markets
are likely to observe greater productivity levels than rms that do not undertake investments
in R&D activities and do not participate in export markets. Investments in R & D activities
as well as export participation allow rms to generate positive learning e¤ects that contribute
to subsequent gains in their productivity levels. However, such investments require up-front
payment of xed costs, which can only be paid by rms that observe a substantial initial level
16As the number of rms within each 4 digit industry in each country and time period may be limited, there
is a possibility that many rms have values equal to that of the median rm.
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of productivity. Constantini and Melitz (2008) determine the role of the timing of trade liberal-
ization on the strategies of exporting rms to innovate, as lower trade costs generate incentives
for rms to invest in innovative activities to obtain greater returns due to higher productivity
levels in the future.
Girma (2008) introduces the concept of the impact of foreign competition on exporters as
it determines that rms exposed to international markets may need to raise their productivity
levels through investments in R & D activities and higher technology inputs in order to remain
competitive. Considering British and Irish rms, Girma et al (2008) suggest the evidence for
learning by exporting is greater for the Irish rms as they are likely to be more dependent
upon foreign markets than the British rms. Lileeva and Treer (2010) determine that the
Canadian plants which export their products are likely to participate in process innovation and
adopt improved technology as their productivity levels increase. Nardis and Pappalardo (2009)
determine that exporting rms that undertake product switching activities are likely to perform
better than those rms that do not undertake any product switching activities. Brambilla et al
(2009) consider R& D activities to indicate the level of sophistication of rms and associate R & D
activities with the increase in the likelihood that the rms will introduce new products. Growth
in labor productivity allows such plants and rms to invest in higher technology, improved
production processes and in relation to this paper, invest in product switching activities to
achieve higher competency in their range of products.
[Figure 4 about here]
[Figure 5 about here]
In Figure 4, I sort the percentage of rms that undertake each product switching activity
into groups categorized on the basis of rms that i) invest in both R & D activities and export
participation and ii) invest in R & D activities or export participation but not both. Firms that
invest in both activities, R & D and export participation, are also more likely to churn products
than their counterparts. Firms that undertake investments in R&D activities and export partic-
ipation are likely to observe greater productivity levels, which can increase the likelihood that
rms will churn products. On the other hand, there can be several exporters that adopt higher
quality inputs in order to substitute for the investments in R & D activities, while several rms
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that invest in R & D activities but not necessarily export their products directly. Firms that
undertake either of the two investments, R & D activities and export participation, can also
increase the probability that they will undertake product switching activities. Their produc-
tivity levels can be lower than rms that undertake both investments but can be high enough
to allow them to pay the xed costs associated with product switching activities. However, I
will determine whether the group of rms that undertake either of the two investments, R & D
activities or export participation, will churn products rather than undertake the other product
switching activities as such rms are exposed to the pressure from foreign competition.
The correlation of 12% between rms that experience pressure from foreign competition
and undertake both or either of the two investments suggests that rms facing pressure from
foreign competition are not strongly biased towards the group of rms that invest in both
activities. As majority of the rms export rather than invest in R & D activities, rms that
undertake either investments are likely to have rms report exposure to foreign competition as
their products compete in foreign markets. However, such rms are likely to be characterized by
lower productivity levels than rms that invest in both R & D activities and export participation.
In accordance to the theoretical model represented earlier, productivity levels should play an
important role in dening the ability of rms to churn products, as can be observed in Figure
5. Firms exposed to foreign competition will churn products if they are characterized by the
necessary levels of productivity.
[Table 6 about here]
In Table 6, the impact of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new
products signicantly inuences rms that invest in R & D activities and export as well to churn
products, at either the 1% level or the 5% level of signicance, but there is no impact of pressure
from foreign competition on rms within the group that undertakes either but not both of the
activities. This can indicate that rms which are perceived to be more productive than their
counterparts and have invested in activities that increase their knowledge base are more likely
to switch products to achieve a product range closer to their core competency with exposure to
foreign competition. Firms that invest in either of the activities observe investments in R & D
activities to signicantly inuence the decision to churn products, at either the 1% level or the
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5% level of signicance, rather than do not undertake any product switching activity and drop
products only.
This result asserts the complementing nature of R & D activities and export participation.
Within the group of rms that have paid the up-front xed costs for investments in R & D ac-
tivities and export participation, it is likely that they will churn products rather than undertake
other activities as exposed to foreign competition. For such rms, exogenous variations through
pressure from foreign competitors can inuence them to churn products. Firms that are not
participating in both R & D activities and export activities may not exhibit the productivity
levels necessary to pay the xed costs necessary to churn products as they are exposed to for-
eign competition. Firms within this group that face pressure from foreign competition are not
likely to churn products rather than undertake other product switching activities. The other
indicators on the pressure from competition, from domestic competitors and customers, do not
have any positive signicant impact on the decision of rms to churn products within the two
groups of rms. It is also interesting to note that the import status is likely to inuence rms
to churn products rather than add products only but it will inuence rms that invest in R &
D activities and export to drop products only than churn products. Importers are not likely to
increase the size of their product range but may tend to contract it as importing rms may focus
on a limited product range, which can be a result of the relatively expensive and higher quality
foreign inputs. In columns 2 and 6, the variable on R & D is signicant and positive at either
the 1% level or the 5% level, determining that rms which only invest in R & D activities are
likely to churn products rather than not undertake any product switching activities and drop
products only. However, I do not observe R & D activities to inuence rms to churn products
rather than add products only. This can imply that rms that invest in R & D activities may
not necessarily promote rms to churn products rather than add products only.
[Table 7 about here]
In Table 7, I observe that the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision on
production costs signicantly inuences the probability that rms will churn products rather
than add products only and drop products only within the group of rms that undertake both
investments, at the 1% level and the 5% level respectively. The e¤ect of pressure from foreign
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competition on the decision on production costs does not signicantly inuence rms to churn
products rather than not undertake any product switching activities. This can imply that if
xed costs to churn products is signicant in comparison to not undertake any product switch-
ing activities, rms facing pressure on production costs will not churn products to lower their
production costs to achieve cost-based competence. They may only churn products rather than
add products only and drop products only in order to achieve such competence. Other variables
observed are very similar to that in Table 6, except that the pressure from domestic competitors
on production costs is likely to positively inuence rms to churn products than drop products
only.
The e¤ect of foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products and on production
costs signicantly inuences rms to churn products within the category of rms that have
invested in R & D activities and participate as exporters. However, if rms have undertaken
either one of the investments but not both, rms within this category are not likely to churn
products rather than undertake other product switching activities. As rms that churn products
may pay substantially greater xed costs than rms that undertake other product switching
activities, the productivity gains from investing in R & D activities and participating in export
activities may be essential. With no evidence that foreign competition inuences rms to churn
products if rms invest in either R & D activities or export participation but not both activities,
it is likely that the lack of productivity within this group of rms is inhibiting them. The analysis
in the following section considers rms sorted according to the availability of educated workforce
that can increase the productivity levels of rms.
Adequately Educated Labor
Acemoglu (2000) discusses the increase in skill bias in production due to the change in technology
available such as personal computers and other skill-complementary investments. With the
assumption that skilled labor and unskilled labor are imperfect substitutes, it is di¢ cult for
rms that hire workers who lack adequate education to adapt to tasks that require certain
specialized knowledge in order to undertake product switching activities. The benet of having
skilled or educated labor not only allows rms to introduce new products that are of original
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variety but also allows rms to imitate products introduced by rms that are similar in nature
as rms adopt technological change. Pointed out in Aghion (2002), there is an increase in
demand of skill premium as a result of faster pace of technological change that may accompany
introduction of new technologies as this may require adjustment and restructuring necessary to
learn the new technology. Falvey et al (2008) suggest that increased foreign competition can lead
to disparities between wages of skilled and unskilled labor leading workers to switch from one
industry to another. Further, skill upgrading within an industry that faces foreign competition
may potentially increase the demand for skilled labor, where rms may need to employ more
skilled workers.
This dataset provides a rm level indicator that determines whether rms have adequately
educated labor. Firms are considered to have adequately educated labor if the rms record a
lower value for the constraint due to uneducated labor than the median value of the constraint
within the respective 4 digit ISIC industry in a given country and year 17 . Firms that face an
inadequately educated workforce can be associated with their greater demand for educated labor
than currently met by them. Inadequately educated workforce can indicate the desire of rms to
undertake product switching activities and move towards core competence as they seek educated
labor to undertake such activities. It is likely that rms which invest heavily in R&D activities
are likely to be constrained by the lack of educated labor as they seek to complement their R&D
activities by enhancing the knowledge base of their workforce. The positive correlation between
R & D activities and the degree of the constraint of inadequately educated workforce indicate
such a relationship.
[Figure 6 about here]
[Figure 7 about here]
In Figure 6, I show that the rms with adequately educated labor are slightly more likely to
add products only followed by churn products, with the least number of rms likely to drop prod-
ucts only. I also determine that the ranking is almost consistent across the constraints. Firms
17The xed e¤ect industry dummy is at the 3 digit level as there is a potential problem of very few number
of observations within certain 4 digit ISIC industries. As industry medians can still be calculated at the 4 digit
industry level, I prefer to implement this level of disaggregation to calculate whether rms are constrained due
to inadequately educated labor.
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with inadequately educated labor are more likely to undertake product switching activities, as
their demand for educated labor can be connected to their undertaking of product switching
activities. However, it is important to note that the di¤erences in the percentage of rms un-
dertaking each of the product switching activity is not large across the two groups determining
the constraints due to lack of adequately educated labor. In Figure 7, I present the distribution
of the pressure from foreign competition according to the product switching activities. The
distribution of rms that face pressure is similar across the two groups of rms with adequately
educated and inadequately educated labor. There is a correlation of only 6% between the con-
straints that rms have inadequately educated labor and face pressure from foreign competition,
indicating that the impact of pressure from foreign competition is not strongly biased towards a
single group of rms. For instance, rms that desire high-skilled labor can be heavily constrained
by the lack of having an adequately educated workforce even if they are able to employ all skilled
labor available and are not able to generate enough productivity. On the other hand, rms that
produce using a large proportion of unskilled labor can also be constrained by the lack of having
an adequately educated workforce if they are to undergo changes in the production process that
may alter the need for educated workers and their desire for greater productivity. Further, rms
that are heavily constrained by the lack of adequately educated labor may not possess the labor
sophistication necessary to undertake product switching activities that may require specialized
training of their employees to obtain the productivity levels necessary for such activities.
With the assumption that skilled labor tends to be more mobile than unskilled labor, similarly
educated labor can move between products much more easily than uneducated labor. The basic
idea of this constraint is that rms with adequately educated labor are not demanding educated
labor given the supply of educated labor within the economy and are likely to be more exible in
allocating labor. The degree of the constraint can dictate whether the shocks from the pressure
of foreign competition can induce rms to churn products as they can easily employ workers
that are more mobile between products. Therefore, I can predict that the e¤ect of pressure from
foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products and on production costs should
have a greater inuence on rms that churn products if they have adequately educated labor.
Even though such rms are less likely to undertake product switching activities, the pressure
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from foreign competition does inuence rms with adequately educated labor to churn products,
as will be observed in the following tables.
[Table 8 about here]
In Table 8, for rms characterized by adequately educated labor, I observe the e¤ect of
pressure from foreign competition on the decision of rms to introduce new products to have
a positive and signicant impact at the 1% level on the rms that churn products rather than
rms that do not undertake any product switching activities. Similar result is obtained for
rms that churn products rather than add products only. Again, there is no signicant impact
on rms that churn products against rms that drop products only across the levels of labor
constraints. I observe a similar pattern for rms that churn products rather than add products
only, with only the export status signicantly impacting, at the 1% level, the probability that
rms with churn products. The e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to
introduce new products, R & D activities and the percentage of employees with a university
degree inuence rms with inadequately educated workforce to churn products rather than add
products only at the 10% level of signicance. Firms that have adequately educated labor are
likely to drop products only rather than churn products, at the 10% level of signicance, if they
face pressure from customers on the decision to introduce new products.
[Table 9 about here]
In Table 9, the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the production costs inuences
the probability at the 10% level that rms characterized by adequately educated labor are likely
to churn products rather than add products only and not undertake any product switching
activities. Further, pressure from customers and domestic competitors are signicant for rms
that are likely to churn products rather than add products only at the 5% level. Firms with
adequately educated labor are likely to churn products rather than drop products only as the
e¤ect of pressure from domestic competitors on the production costs increases, with the level
of signicance recorded at the 1% level. Firms that have inadequately educated labor are likely
to drop products only rather than churn products at the 5% level if the pressure from domestic
competitors on production costs increases and at the 10% level if the pressure from customers
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on production costs decreases. Although, the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition is
signicant only at 10% level, it does indicate that rms with adequately educated labor will
likely move towards the product range that exhibits cost-based competence.
The di¤erences in the constraints by the level of adequately educated labor indicate that
rms with adequately educated labor are more likely to churn products if they face pressure
from foreign competition than not undertake any product switching activities and add products
only. Firms that lack adequately educated labor are not able to churn products and invest in
production of a product range closer to their core competency as they are exposed to pressure
from foreign competition, except for the case where I do observe a slight impact at the 10% level
of signicance on the probability that the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the
decision to introduce new products will increase the likelihood that the rm will churn products
rather than add products only. The signicance of rm characteristics also suggests that rms
which are larger, possess nancial leverage, have formally trained labor, and a greater percentage
of employees with a university degree are also likely to churn products. This can imply that
rms with higher rm level characteristics and not constrained by inadequately educated labor
are likely to make investments in order to improve the e¢ ciency of the product range as they
have labor that is more mobile. I can determine no signicance in the probability that the e¤ect
of pressure from foreign competition on introduction of new products and on production costs
inuences rms that drop products to churn products instead. It is important to note that the
e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new products is more
signicant on rms that churn products than the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition
on production costs. The e¤ect of the pressure from domestic competitors and customers on
the production costs also inuences rms to churn products. In summary, rms that have
adequately educated labor are more adaptive to the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition
on both the decisions to introduce new products and on production costs than rms that are
constrained by the lack of education of their workforce. However, rms are more likely to adapt
to the quality-based competence than to the cost-based competence as the e¤ect of pressure from
foreign competition on the introduction of new products is signicant at the 1% level compared
to the 10% level of signicance of the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on production
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costs.
The major di¤erence between the results in this section and the previous section where rms
invest in R&D activities and export participation is that pressure from foreign competition
does not inuence rms to churn products rather than drop products only even if rms do
possess adequately educated labor, while investments in R&D activities is likely to increase the
probability that rms will churn products rather than drop products only. This implies that rms
which invest in R&D activities and participate in export activities are likely to churn products
rather than drop products only if exposed to foreign competition but adequate knowledge base
may not necessarily have the same e¤ect for such rms.
Contract Intensity
Nunn (2007) determines whether countries that have good environments for contractual agree-
ments are likely to trade in products that require relationship-specic investments. Such invest-
ments involve asymmetric information between the contracting parties, which can lead to hold-up
problems. Contracts between rms can be signed in order to mitigate this problem. However,
such contracts can be very costly due to legal considerations. Although contractual agreements
can be plagued with issues related to asymmetric information and moral hazard, they can also
promote trade in the form of production networks between rms and increase productivity lev-
els of rms as they purchase inputs that may be customized to their production process. This
e¤ect is similar to investments in R & D activities and export activities as rms may generate
productivity levels necessary to switch products by paying up-front xed costs associated with
the contract intensive investments. Eckel et al (2010) implement a similar measure of product
di¤erentiation to determine whether the strategy of rms is to achieve cost-based competence or
quality-based competence as rms may switch products to achieve a more competent range of
products. Nakhoda (2012) determines the relationship between the extensive and the intensive
margins of exports on the extensive and the intensive margins of import of foreign technology
for the sample of CEEC and Central Asian countries for the varying contract intensity at the
industry level18 . With the likely existence of production networks between countries that exist
18Nakhoda (2012) has a useful discussion on this indicator measuring the contract intensive nature of industries.
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in the region, particularly with the developed and advanced countries of Western Europe, I can
predict a pattern of product switching activities undertaken by rms.
The measure of contract intensity is borrowed from Nunn (2007) and Manova et al (2011).
With large di¤erences in market power between the suppliers and the buyers, the contracting
party with greater market power can inuence the decision on introduction of new products and
on production costs of the other contracting rms. For instance, if the relationship between
the parties allows the rms to introduce new products, then the pressure on the introduction of
new products can be signicant on product churning activities within industries dened by high
contract intensity. On the other hand, the more traditional contractual agreements can have
prices xed in advance, and make production costs important for rms. Such rms may prefer
to achieve cost-based competence.
[Figure 8 about here]
[Figure 9 about here]
Figures 8 and 9 dene the percentage of rms undertaking di¤erent switching activities and
the e¤ect of foreign competition on these activities. The number of observations of product
switching activities and pressure from foreign competition per contract intensity at the industry
level is listed in Appendix E1 and E2 respectively.
[Table 10 about here]
In Table 10, the e¤ect of pressure from domestic competition on the decision to introduce
new products positively impacts the decision of rms to churn products rather than not under-
take any product switching within low contract intensive industries. On the other hand, none
of the variables on the pressure to introduce new products signicantly inuence rms to churn
products within high contract intensive industries. The e¤ect of pressure from foreign competi-
tion on introduction of new products signicantly impacts the probability that rms will churn
products rather than add products only within both types of industries. Within low contract
intensive industries, the domestic pressure has a positive impact at the 10% level of signicance,
while the pressure from customers has a negative impact at the 10% level of signicance within
high contract intensive industries. The pressure from customers in high contract industries may
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rather increase the probability that rms do not churn products but only add products to their
product range. Further, within high contract intensive industries, R&D investments does not
signicantly impact the probability that the rms will churn products rather than add products
only, implying the nature of contractual relationship may reduce the incentive for rms to invest
in R&D activities and rms may nd it di¢ cult to eliminate obsolete products. This can also
imply that rms are likely to borrow technology from their contracting partners, reducing the
need for investments in R&D activities. Pressure from domestic competition positively impacts
the decision of rms to churn products rather than drop products within low contract intensity
industries at the 10% level of signicance and within high contract intensity industries at the
5% level of signicance19 . Within high contract intensity industries, I observe the percentage of
employees with a university degree to increase the likelihood that rms churn their products at
either the 5% or 1% level of signicance. This may indicate that within such industries, rms
may require employment of highly educated workforce in order to achieve core competency.
[Table 11 about here]
In Table 11, I observe the impact of pressure from foreign competition on the decision on
production costs to positively inuence rms that churn products rather than add products
only within high contract intensive industries at the 5% level of signicance. The e¤ect of
pressure from foreign competition on the decision on production costs increases the likelihood
that rms will churn products rather than add products only if they are within industries
that sell di¤erentiated products. On the other hand, the pressure from foreign competition
on production costs has a negative impact on the decision of rms to churn products rather
than drop products only within low contract intensive industries. When rms are not bound
by contractual agreements they are likely to drop products only instead of churning products
as they can be under pressure to reduce their marginal costs of production and sell products
that are closer to their core competency. However, the inuence of pressure from domestic
competitors on production costs positively inuences rms to churn products rather than add
19The presence of rms within a high contract intensity industry rather than low contract intensity is deter-
mined by the sales of their main product. If multiproduct rms sell additional products that do not require
contracts between the suppliers and the buyers, they can drop those products without facing penalties imposed
on breaking contractual agreements.
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products only within high contract intensive industries, but positively inuences rms to churn
products rather than drop products only across both industries at either the 5% level or the 10%
level of signicance. Pressure from customers on production costs signicantly inuences rms to
churn products rather than not undertake any product switching activities or add products only
within low contract intensive industries at the 1% level of signicance, implying the importance
of such pressure within industries in which products are sold or inputs purchased from the spot
market.
In conclusion, I can determine that the e¤ect of pressure to introduce new products, foreign
and domestic, inuences rms to churn products rather than add products only is stronger, with
the signicance at the 1% level, within industries characterized by low contract intensity rather
than within industries characterized by high contract intensity, which records the signicance at
the 5% level. The inuence of the pressure from foreign competition and domestic competition
on production costs is stronger on the probability that a rm will churn products, as the sig-
nicance is recorded at the 5% level, within industries characterized by high contract intensity.
Comparatively, either no signicance or signicance at the 10% level for the impact of these
variables is recorded for rms within industries characterized by low contract intensity. This
can indicate that the contractual agreements are of a more traditional nature, where the focus
of the subcontracting party is to lower production costs. Further, Eckel et al (2010) suggest that
di¤erentiated products within high contract intensive industries are likely to focus on quality-
based competence, while non-di¤erentiated products within low contract intensive industries
are likely to focus on cost-based competence. However, in this paper, I observe rms that sell
di¤erentiated products are also likely to focus on cost-based competence if the objective of rms
as subcontractors is to lower production costs. As terms of contracts may involve low prices
for their di¤erentiated products, rms can be contract bound to lower production costs as rms
are inuenced by the e¤ect of pressure on production costs. If rms sell di¤erentiated products
that are bound by contracts and are more sensitive to di¤erences in quality across products,
rms are likely to churn products rather than add products only within highly di¤erentiated
industries as they face pressure from foreign competition on the introduction of new products
and on production costs to achieve both desired quality-based and cost-based competence, which
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is observed in Tables 10 and 11. This is similar to the results in Table 6 and 7. Firms that
have paid up-front xed costs to invest in either R & D activities or belong within industries
characterized by high contract intensity that are likely to achieve quality-based and cost-based
competence. On the other hand, if rms sell non-di¤erentiated products the e¤ect of the pressure
from foreign competition and pressure from domestic competitors on the decision to introduce
new products and the e¤ect of pressure from customers on the decision on production costs is
likely to inuence rms to churn products rather than add products only.
Firms that churn products rather than add products only within low contract intensive indus-
tries are likely to be inuenced by the pressure to introduce new products, but it is pressure from
customers on production costs that promotes the cost-based competence for rms that churn
products rather than undertake neither product switching activities. Aghion and Schankerman
(1998) suggest that in a more competitive environment where price competition between rms
can be severe, which can be indicated by trading in a spot market, fewer high cost rms will
be present as reduction of transaction costs improves entry of low cost rms into such indus-
tries. With low transaction costs between rms and customers due to the less contract intensive
nature of the industries within which rms are present, the pressure from customers on pro-
duction costs will play a signicant role in inuencing rms to move towards core competency
as customers may demand lower prices for the products. The di¤erences in contract intensity
has revealed the e¤ect of pressure from competition in di¤erent environments where transaction
costs, asymmetry of costs between high cost and low cost rms and the market density for rms
may vary.
Conclusion
I determine that the impact of pressure from foreign competition on the decision to introduce new
products and on production costs inuences rms to churn products, particularly those rms that
add products only and do not undertake any product switching activities. Hence, I conclude
that the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition is selective. The pressure from foreign
competition has no e¤ect on inuencing rms to churn products rather than drop products only,
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except when the rm has invested in both R & D activities and export participation. Further,
the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition to introduce new products and on production
costs vary as the former is found to have a greater inuence on the product churning activities
of rms rather than the latter in terms of the level of signicance as well as the coe¢ cients
on the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition. Therefore, rms that add varieties to their
product range are instead likely to churn products and move towards their core competency,
which is more likely to be quality-based, under the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition.
On the other hand, foreign competition has no inuence on rms that reduce their variety to
churn products instead. I can conclude that trade and investment liberalization by countries
that allow rms to be inuenced by foreign competition has a benecial e¤ect on rms that add
varieties to their product range as they are also likely to replace their old products with a better
quality or a lower cost option of products.
Subgroups on the basis of rm level investment activities and characteristics determine
whether the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition is concentrated within rms that in-
vest in R & D activities and export participation and possess adequately educated labor. It is
indeed the case, as rms investing in R & D activities and export participation are likely to churn
products rather than not undertake any product switching activities as they face pressure from
foreign competition on the decision on introduction of new products and on production costs.
The pressure from foreign competition has a signicant e¤ect for rms that possess adequately
educated labor, as both pressure on introduction of new products and pressure on production
costs signicantly inuence the decision of rms to churn products rather than not undertake
any product switching activities and add products only. Regardless of the nature of contract
intensity of industries, rms that face pressure from foreign competition on introduction of new
products are likely to churn products rather than add products only. However, the e¤ect of pres-
sure from foreign competition on production costs is likely to be signicant only for rms that
are within industries characterized by high contract intensity. Further, pressure from customers
on production costs will increase the likelihood that rms will churn products within industries
characterized by low contract intensity, as it indicates the nature of rms where products are
likely to be exchanged on a spot market.
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I contribute to the literature on multi-product rms and their product switching activities
as I study the e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition on rms that churn products rather
than undertake other activities related to product switching. I determine the importance of
such pressure on rms that move towards core competency as they face challenges to allocate
their resources optimally in order to provide their customers with the greatest possible value
from their product and at the same time reduce their own costs of production. Policymakers
can benet from this study as it determines that e¤ect of pressure from foreign competition
inuences rms to churn products within the group of rms that are likely to invest in R & D
activities and export participation or have access to an adequately educated workforce or belong
to industries that are characterized by high contract intensity.
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Tables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic R and D Full Time Sales Per Export Import
Dep Variables: Firm Prod Workers Worker (t-3) Status Status
Add Products Only -0.029* 0.162*** 12.254 0.093*** 0.145*** 0.136***
(0.017) (0.021) (7.563) (0.033) (0.022) (0.016)
Drop Products Only -0.009 0.063*** 17.740 0.002 0.072** 0.107***
(0.018) (0.021) (12.122) (0.047) (0.031) (0.026)
Churn Products Only -0.050*** 0.280*** 41.748*** 0.110*** 0.230*** 0.229***
(0.017) (0.021) (9.441) (0.042) (0.023) (0.016)
Constant 0.001 -8.074 0.920***
(0.040) (19.651) (0.025)
Observations 4,000 4,075 4,075 4,075 4,052 3,987
R-squared 0.211 0.158 0.007
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Capacity Age of Financial Formal Perc Univ
Dep Variables: Utilization Firm Leverage Training Degree
Add Products Only -1.187 0.378 0.148*** 0.189*** 2.548***
(0.863) (0.688) (0.019) (0.023) (0.746)
Drop Products Only -6.703*** 2.976*** 0.100*** 0.160*** 1.002
(1.430) (1.001) (0.025) (0.030) (0.974)
Churn Products Only -5.921*** 2.781*** 0.194*** 0.278*** 4.360***
(0.971) (0.837) (0.019) (0.025) (0.828)
Constant 78.069*** 10.858*** 18.238***
(2.500) (1.416) (2.062)
Observations 4,075 4,075 4,044 4,053 4,075
R-squared 0.126 0.141 0.282
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
Table 1: Probit and OLS Estimations of Firm Characteristics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only Neither Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Innovation 0.090*** 0.100*** -0.001
(Dummy) (0.025) (0.022) (0.031)
Press Foreign Cost 0.057** 0.075*** 0.003
(Dummy) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029)
Domestic Firm 0.012 -0.010 -0.020 0.018 -0.008 -0.018
(0.040) (0.043) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.037)
R and D 0.290*** 0.087*** 0.179*** 0.292*** 0.091*** 0.171***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026)
No FT Prod Workers -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) 0.001 -0.005 0.027 0.002 -0.004 0.025
(0.016) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.019)
Export Status 0.111*** 0.015 0.079** 0.113*** 0.019 0.076**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.034)
Import Status 0.162*** 0.086*** 0.083** 0.171*** 0.091*** 0.080**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032)
Cap. Util -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of Firm -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.155*** 0.029 0.052* 0.150*** 0.026 0.055*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
Formal Training 0.174*** 0.062** 0.054* 0.176*** 0.060** 0.053*
(0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.028)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,406 2,148 1,472 2,408 2,138 1,464
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 2: Probit Estimation of Pressure From Foreign Competition
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Innovation -0.045 0.286 -1.126*
(0.487) (0.453) (0.598)
Domestic Firm -0.016 -0.124 -0.050 -0.116 -0.078 -0.134
(0.108) (0.111) (0.106) (0.101) (0.118) (0.107)
R and D 0.773*** 0.231*** 0.218** 0.202*** 0.591*** 0.251**
(0.082) (0.082) (0.096) (0.071) (0.091) (0.103)
No FT Prod Workers -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) -0.024 0.019 -0.014 -0.009 0.074 0.031
(0.039) (0.036) (0.025) (0.031) (0.062) (0.038)
Export Status 0.299*** 0.428*** -0.004 0.416*** 0.378*** 0.433***
(0.107) (0.078) (0.102) (0.073) (0.110) (0.094)
Import Status 0.494*** 0.413*** 0.181* 0.386*** 0.417*** 0.543***
(0.100) (0.066) (0.094) (0.096) (0.124) (0.115)
Cap. Util -0.007*** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.003** -0.002 -0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age of Firm 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Financial Leverage 0.401*** 0.058 0.038 0.004 0.225** 0.203*
(0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.069) (0.092) (0.104)
Formal Training 0.449*** 0.024 0.156** 0.026 0.105 -0.042
(0.078) (0.063) (0.067) (0.073) (0.089) (0.090)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.007*** 0.002 0.003* -0.001 0.005** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obstacle from Customs 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.158***
and Trade Regulation (0.029) (0.025) (0.043)
Constant -0.340 -0.714*** 0.218 -0.349* 0.249 -0.197
(0.394) (0.251) (0.324) (0.199) (0.387) (0.268)
Underident Test (p-value) 0 0 0
Weak ident Test (F-stat) 39 39 22
Wald test of rho=0 0.613 0.908 0.234
Observations 2,220 2,220 1,979 1,979 1,406 1,406
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 3: Bi Probit Estimation of Pressure From Foreign Competition on Introduction of New
Products
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Cost -0.314 -0.052 -1.044*
(0.487) (0.476) (0.542)
Domestic Firm -0.014 -0.184* -0.051 -0.147 -0.059 -0.108
(0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.098) (0.119) (0.113)
R and D 0.783*** 0.251*** 0.245*** 0.209*** 0.551*** 0.199**
(0.082) (0.072) (0.091) (0.068) (0.090) (0.096)
No FT Prod Workers -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) -0.024 -0.018 -0.013 -0.031 0.062 0.005
(0.039) (0.043) (0.027) (0.030) (0.057) (0.059)
Export Status 0.313*** 0.339*** 0.045 0.369*** 0.375*** 0.444***
(0.092) (0.082) (0.097) (0.084) (0.116) (0.114)
Import Status 0.520*** 0.261*** 0.223** 0.338*** 0.315*** 0.280***
(0.084) (0.070) (0.090) (0.091) (0.092) (0.100)
Cap. Util -0.007*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.003* -0.002 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age of Firm -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Financial Leverage 0.387*** 0.053 0.033 -0.032 0.209** 0.130
(0.080) (0.072) (0.075) (0.070) (0.096) (0.101)
Formal Training 0.459*** 0.098 0.157** 0.063 0.152* 0.107
(0.078) (0.065) (0.063) (0.068) (0.089) (0.079)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.007*** -0.000 0.003 -0.003** 0.005* -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obstacles from Customs 0.167*** 0.187*** 0.178***
and Trade Regulations (0.029) (0.029) (0.037)
Constant -0.249 -0.533** 0.339 -0.714*** 0.110 -0.430
(0.395) (0.253) (0.295) (0.237) (0.364) (0.282)
Underident Test (p-value) 0 0 0
Weak ident Test (F-stat) 25 40 30
Wald test of rho=0 0.394 0.637 0.189
Observations 2,221 2,221 1,969 1,969 1,398 1,398
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 4: Bi Probit Estimation of Pressure From Foreign Competition on Production Costs
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Innovation 0.070*** 0.098*** -0.004
(0.027) (0.022) (0.033)
Press Dom Innovation 0.057* 0.036 0.027
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
Press Cust Innovation 0.024 -0.015 -0.024
(0.030) (0.031) (0.028)
Press Foreign Cost 0.029 0.055** -0.017
(0.031) (0.026) (0.032)
Press Dom Cost 0.024 0.024 0.055*
(0.030) (0.027) (0.033)
Press Cust Cost 0.075** 0.053* 0.002
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Domestic Firm -0.003 -0.019 -0.029 0.014 -0.015 -0.024
(0.040) (0.043) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.038)
R and D 0.294*** 0.093*** 0.185*** 0.288*** 0.087*** 0.173***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027)
No FT Prod Workers -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) -0.001 -0.005 0.027 0.005 -0.003 0.026
(0.016) (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) (0.011) (0.019)
Export Status 0.119*** 0.016 0.084** 0.122*** 0.025 0.085**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.033)
Import Status 0.158*** 0.083*** 0.081** 0.170*** 0.090*** 0.077**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (0.026) (0.032)
Cap. Util -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of Firm -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.152*** 0.027 0.050* 0.147*** 0.022 0.053*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
Formal Training 0.173*** 0.063** 0.058** 0.172*** 0.060** 0.052*
(0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.003*** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,390 2,136 1,463 2,396 2,124 1,457
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 5: Probit Estimation of Pressure from Competition and Customers
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R&D and Exports Both Either Both Either Both Either
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Innovation 0.331*** 0.053 0.248*** 0.055 0.088** -0.006
(0.110) (0.055) (0.065) (0.047) (0.037) (0.045)
Press Dom Innovation -0.078 0.057 0.018 0.000 0.011 0.053
(0.069) (0.054) (0.064) (0.057) (0.014) (0.042)
Press Cust Innovation 0.087 -0.014 -0.085 0.015 0.002 -0.123**
(0.119) (0.063) (0.074) (0.049) (0.012) (0.058)
R and D 0.201*** 0.082 0.110**
(0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
Domestic Firm 0.170* 0.055 -0.039 0.009 0.001 -0.075
(0.090) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.014) (0.054)
No FT Prod Workers 0.0003** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) -0.209*** -0.008 0.003 -0.012 -0.004 0.048*
(0.063) (0.026) (0.037) (0.015) (0.011) (0.025)
Import Status 0.031 0.085 0.243*** 0.141** -0.023*** 0.004
(0.109) (0.070) (0.092) (0.063) (0.009) (0.062)
Cap. Util -0.000 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Age of Firm 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.076 0.168*** 0.062 0.039 0.023 0.042
(0.079) (0.051) (0.060) (0.047) (0.014) (0.050)
Formal Training 0.234*** 0.109** 0.102* -0.044 0.013 0.023
(0.090) (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.020) (0.039)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.004 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 229 689 419 745 214 489
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 6: Probit Estimation of Pressure From Competition and Customers on Introduction of
New Products per R & D Activities and Export Participation
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R & D and Exports Both Either Both Either Both Either
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Cost 0.106 -0.015 0.211*** 0.006 0.075** -0.031
(0.102) (0.058) (0.069) (0.047) (0.038) (0.049)
Press Dom Cost -0.016 0.013 0.084 -0.005 0.019 0.125**
(0.097) (0.054) (0.063) (0.056) (0.018) (0.063)
Press Cust Cost 0.081 0.082 -0.067 0.079 0.000 -0.045
(0.140) (0.062) (0.081) (0.060) (0.010) (0.055)
R and D 0.172*** 0.063 0.094*
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052)
Domestic Firm 0.144 0.077 -0.037 0.008 -0.000 -0.054
(0.091) (0.064) (0.070) (0.066) (0.011) (0.060)
No FT Prod Workers 0.0004*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) -0.188*** -0.000 0.005 -0.012 -0.005 0.043
(0.059) (0.026) (0.037) (0.015) (0.009) (0.029)
Import Status 0.040 0.081 0.269*** 0.143** -0.019** -0.005
(0.116) (0.066) (0.096) (0.062) (0.009) (0.062)
Cap. Util -0.001 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.004*** 0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Age of Firm 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.128* 0.160*** 0.068 0.031 0.019 0.045
(0.071) (0.052) (0.060) (0.047) (0.013) (0.051)
Formal Training 0.202** 0.116** 0.074 -0.033 0.005 0.025
(0.082) (0.045) (0.059) (0.043) (0.014) (0.042)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.004 0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 230 695 420 738 213 488
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 7: Probit Estimation of Pressure From Competition and Customers on Production Costs
per R & D Activities and Export Participation
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adequately Educated Labor Yes No Yes No Yes No
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Innovation 0.100*** -0.018 0.098*** 0.095* -0.007 -0.029
(0.033) (0.049) (0.032) (0.049) (0.044) (0.047)
Press Dom Innovation 0.067* 0.019 0.052 0.008 0.052 -0.038
(0.035) (0.068) (0.032) (0.061) (0.043) (0.046)
Press Cust Innovation 0.026 0.031 0.018 -0.087 -0.056* 0.071
(0.034) (0.064) (0.035) (0.061) (0.030) (0.058)
Domestic Firm 0.013 0.004 -0.003 -0.010 0.023 -0.148***
(0.045) (0.088) (0.052) (0.073) (0.051) (0.055)
R and D 0.316*** 0.320*** 0.098*** 0.101* 0.209*** 0.193***
(0.038) (0.057) (0.036) (0.059) (0.036) (0.044)
No FT Prod Workers 0.000 -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) -0.007 0.007 0.013 -0.026 0.027 0.039
(0.016) (0.030) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
Export Status 0.077** 0.218*** -0.017 0.151*** 0.082** 0.021
(0.038) (0.065) (0.035) (0.052) (0.042) (0.061)
Import Status 0.176*** 0.137* 0.078** 0.087 0.063 0.103
(0.033) (0.072) (0.037) (0.055) (0.046) (0.092)
Cap. Util -0.003*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of Firm -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.119*** 0.237*** -0.020 0.091 0.066* 0.033
(0.039) (0.049) (0.032) (0.057) (0.036) (0.061)
Formal Training 0.155*** 0.185*** 0.060** 0.032 0.068* 0.123***
(0.033) (0.058) (0.031) (0.061) (0.038) (0.044)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.002** 0.005*** 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,678 626 1,453 614 961 402
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 8: Probit Estimation of Pressure from Competition and Customers on Introduction of
New Products per Educated Labor Constraints
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Adequately Educated Labor Yes No Yes No Yes No
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Cost 0.064* -0.051 0.058* 0.063 -0.033 -0.009
(0.036) (0.053) (0.033) (0.055) (0.042) (0.052)
Press Dom Cost 0.025 0.048 0.072** -0.087 0.137*** -0.094**
(0.037) (0.065) (0.034) (0.055) (0.043) (0.042)
Press Cust Cost 0.082** 0.039 0.068** 0.042 -0.035 0.099*
(0.039) (0.063) (0.034) (0.066) (0.044) (0.059)
Domestic Firm 0.033 0.044 -0.005 0.010 0.019 -0.142**
(0.045) (0.089) (0.053) (0.078) (0.050) (0.057)
R and D 0.310*** 0.320*** 0.092*** 0.080 0.191*** 0.191***
(0.038) (0.058) (0.035) (0.059) (0.036) (0.045)
No FT Prod Workers 0.000 -0.000 0.0001** -0.000 0.000 -0.0004*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002)
Sales per Worker (t-3) -0.005 0.016 0.016 -0.031* 0.023 0.041
(0.016) (0.029) (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.027)
Export Status 0.080** 0.234*** -0.008 0.162*** 0.085** 0.012
(0.037) (0.063) (0.035) (0.050) (0.040) (0.058)
Import Status 0.188*** 0.140* 0.082** 0.089 0.053 0.109
(0.032) (0.072) (0.037) (0.058) (0.045) (0.092)
Cap. Util -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of Firm -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.114*** 0.227*** -0.031 0.103* 0.076** 0.028
(0.039) (0.049) (0.032) (0.059) (0.036) (0.062)
Formal Training 0.152*** 0.182*** 0.060** 0.034 0.067* 0.119***
(0.032) (0.056) (0.030) (0.062) (0.038) (0.044)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.002** 0.005*** 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,681 632 1,444 611 957 400
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 9: Probit Estimation of Pressure from Competition and Customers on Production Costs
per Educated Labor Constraints
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract Intensity Low High Low High Low High
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Innovation 0.042 0.051 0.086*** 0.094** -0.070 0.010
(0.045) (0.038) (0.032) (0.037) (0.049) (0.040)
Press Dom Innovation 0.164*** 0.024 0.078* 0.049 0.064* 0.073**
(0.055) (0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.034) (0.032)
Press Cust Innovation 0.051 0.022 0.071 -0.079* 0.053 -0.077**
(0.040) (0.050) (0.047) (0.044) (0.038) (0.034)
Domestic Firm 0.095 -0.039 -0.008 -0.018 -0.076 0.032
(0.068) (0.071) (0.057) (0.064) (0.062) (0.044)
R and D 0.329*** 0.316*** 0.138*** 0.029 0.193*** 0.194***
(0.033) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.032) (0.041)
No FT Prod Workers -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) 0.032 0.000 -0.002 0.023 0.026 0.026
(0.023) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.019)
Export Status 0.137*** 0.214*** 0.055 0.071 0.054 0.143***
(0.041) (0.049) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047)
Import Status 0.208*** 0.165*** 0.109*** 0.107** 0.143*** 0.047
(0.043) (0.060) (0.039) (0.045) (0.040) (0.043)
Cap. Util -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of Firm 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.027 0.113** 0.059 0.044
(0.041) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.042) (0.043)
Formal Training 0.228*** 0.150*** 0.090** 0.020 0.065* 0.074**
(0.055) (0.050) (0.042) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.000 0.003*** 0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 891 692 853 718 613 525
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 10: Probit Estimation of Pressure from Competition and Customers on Introduction of
New Products per Contract Intensity of Industries
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract Intensity Low High Low High Low High
Dep Var: Churn Products vs No Switch Add Only Drop Only
Press Foreign Cost -0.033 0.049 0.029 0.100** -0.093** 0.034
(0.039) (0.054) (0.033) (0.041) (0.039) (0.048)
Press Dom Cost 0.069 0.060 0.034 0.087** 0.097** 0.075*
(0.045) (0.056) (0.035) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
Press Cust Cost 0.185*** 0.034 0.135*** -0.037 0.055 -0.037
(0.043) (0.047) (0.032) (0.048) (0.046) (0.045)
Domestic Firm 0.129* -0.023 0.016 -0.024 -0.070 0.029
(0.067) (0.071) (0.061) (0.065) (0.063) (0.046)
R and D 0.326*** 0.305*** 0.138*** 0.030 0.196*** 0.182***
(0.034) (0.046) (0.042) (0.042) (0.034) (0.043)
No FT Prod Workers -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales per Worker (t-3) 0.038 -0.000 0.003 0.023 0.027 0.018
(0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.032) (0.019)
Export Status 0.137*** 0.239*** 0.063 0.083* 0.055 0.139***
(0.040) (0.051) (0.042) (0.046) (0.049) (0.046)
Import Status 0.216*** 0.165*** 0.114*** 0.105** 0.126*** 0.037
(0.044) (0.055) (0.039) (0.044) (0.037) (0.043)
Cap. Util -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of Firm -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial Leverage 0.146*** 0.137*** 0.018 0.100** 0.062 0.035
(0.042) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.042) (0.044)
Formal Training 0.244*** 0.142*** 0.091** 0.009 0.071* 0.059
(0.054) (0.052) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037)
Perc w/ Univ Degree 0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.002** 0.000 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 891 696 846 713 612 522
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes country and year dummies
The dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 denoting rms that churn products
Table 11: Probit Estimation of Pressure from Competition and Customers on Production
Costs per Contract Intensity of Industries
53
Figures
Figure 1: Percentage of Firms Participating in Product Switching Activities
Figure 2: Product Switching Activities and Pressure from Foreign Competition
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Figure 3: Product Switching Activities and Firm Characteristics
Figure 4: Product Switching Activities per Exporting and R&D Activities
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Figure 5: Pressure From Foreign Competition per Exporting and R&D Activities
Figure 6: Product Switching Activities and Educated Labor Constraints
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Figure 7: Pressure from Foreign Competition per Educated Labor Constraints
Figure 8: Product Switching Activities and Contract Intensity of Industries
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Figure 9: Pressure from Foreign Competition per Contract Intensity of Industries
Appendix
Country Name No of Observation Country Name No of Observation
Albania 96 Latvia 124
Armenia 329 Lithuania 142
Azerbaijan 326 Macedonia, FYR 152
Belarus 157 Moldova 314
Bosnia and Herzegovina 178 Montenegro 41
Bulgaria 153 Poland 631
Croatia 103 Romania 563
Czech Republic 167 Russian Federation 807
Estonia 131 Serbia 213
Georgia 161 Slovak Republic 121
Hungary 473 Slovenia 159
Kazakhstan 520 Tajikistan 164
Kyrgyz Republic 141 Ukraine 732
Uzbekistan 190
Appendix A: List of Countries and Number of Observations
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Variable Description
R & D (Dummy)
Investments in research and development activities during
the last 3 years.
Domestic Firm (Dummy) Less than 10% of the firm owned by a foreign entity
# of Full Time Production Workers
Workers (up through supervisor level) engaged in the
production activities closely related to the production
operations. Workers above the working-supervisor
level are excluded.
Sales per Worker ( Ratio to Industry Average)
Sales  divided by number of full-time workers. [Sales/
number of full-time workers] at t-3
Export Status (Dummy)
Sells to an immediate recepient outside the border of
the country
Import Status (Dummy)
Purchases inputs, equipment and installs production
techniques that may have originated from a foreign
source. For instance, imported yarn, foreign licensed
weaving machine and ISO certification can be included
as foreign inputs
Capacity Utilization
The percentage of the maximum level of production
this firm can attain by fully utilizing the machinery,
equipment and its employees
Age of Firm
Number of years the firm has been in operation in the
country
Financial Leverage (Dummy)  Fixed assets funded by private or state owned banks
Formal Training (Dummy)
Has structured and defined curriculum. Includes
classwork, seminar, audio visual presentations,
lectures, workshop and demonstrations.
Percentage of Employees with a University
Degree
Self -explanatory
Note: (Dummy) indicates dummy variable.
Note: Descriptions borrowed from the ‘Questionnaire
Note’ at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. Source of
all variables listed above is Enterprise Surveys
(http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The Word Bank.
Appendix B: Description of Control Variables
Note: Sales per worker is calculated as the ratio to the average of all sales per worker within
its relevant 4 digit industry for each given country and year.
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Appendix D1: Pressure From Foreign Competition on the Introduction of New Products at the
Country Level and GDP per Capita
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Appendix D2: Pressure From Foreign Competition on Production Costs at the Country Level
and GDP per Capita
Product Switching Activities
R&D Investments
and Export
R&D Investment or
Export No Yes Above Median
Below and Equal to
Median
Neither 109 625 586 1884 540 823
Add Only 237 692 521 1368 513 724
Drop Only 61 250 215 540 228 298
Churn 407 700 522 1215 644 705
Notes:
1) The measure for contract intensity only includes those firms that belong to industries for which information could be obtained from Nunn (2007)
R&D Investments\ Export Adequately Educated Labor Contract Intensity
Appendix E1: Number of Observations of Product Switching Activities per Firm and Industry
Characteristics
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Pressure from Foreign Competition
R&D Investments
and Export
R&D Investment or
Export No Yes Above Median
Below and Equal to
Median
on Innovation (High) 572 1276 868 2240 878 1102
 on Costs (High) 562 1257 868 2213 874 1101
on Innovation (Low) 267 1028 995 2827 1158 1492
 on Costs (Low) 276 1052 994 2840 1156 1486
Notes:
1)This determines the overall number of firms that face pressure from foreign competition
The break-up according to churning activities are represented in Figures 5, 7 and 9 respectively
for the three categories
2) The measure for contract intensity only includes those firms that belong to industries for which information could be obtained from Nunn (2007)
R&D Investments\ Export Adequately Educated Labor Contract Intensity
Appendix E2: Number of Observations of Pressure from Foreign Competition per Firm and
Industry Characteristics
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